become full citizens (Ritter 2000) . One of these struggles-the history of women's efforts to gain the right to sit on juries-is relatively unknown today. Yet coordinated campaigns, often led by the League of Women Voters or Business and Professional Women's Clubs, occurred in many U.S. states in the decades following the 1920 ratification of the suffrage amendment. Women lobbied state lawmakers, organized mass letter-writing campaigns, used litigation, and staged scattered protests to convince lawmakers and the public that women ought to be impaneled as jurors.
A close look at jury rights campaigns reveals a historical puzzle. Some of the jury campaigns were successful quickly. For instance, in California, women won the right to sit on juries after only a four-year effort. In other states, however, the campaigns took many years to achieve their goal. In Colorado, women worked for 33 years and only in 1945 were they able to secure a place on juries. The question then is, Why did women gain jury rights rapidly in some states but more slowly in others? Existing studies of social movements have little to say about the pace of policy reform (for rare exceptions, see Almeida and Walker 2006; Skrentny 2006) . Instead, examinations of movement political success typically rely on indicators of whether or not a policy was enacted or implemented (for a review, see Amenta and Caren [2004] ), without exploring why some movements achieve their political goals rapidly while others achieve theirs more slowly.
The women's jury rights campaigns reveal another limitation in our understanding of social movement outcomes. Our detailed investigation of mobilizations by organized women to change jury laws in 15 states shows that some of these campaigns were highly strategic in their efforts, while others were not. Some of the women's jury movement organizations engaged in what we call strategic adaptation, a set of critical steps in which activists adapt their tactics and discourse to developments in the broader political and cultural environment. We develop this concept in detail below, but here point out that while some debate still exists in the social movements literature over the efficacy of movements in winning policy change (Burstein and Sausner 2005; Soule et al. 1999 ), a growing set of findings suggests that movements can and do cause political elites to reform existing policy or to enact new law (Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994; Andrews 2001; Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon et al. 2001; Rucht 1999; Soule and Olzak 2004) . Yet many systematic studies of movement outcomes conclude that movements have a political impact on the basis of an association between the simple presence of a movement or movement organization and a favorable policy outcome. Few studies Direct correspondence to Holly McCammon, Department of Sociology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee 37235. E-Mail: holly.mccammon@vanderbilt.edu.
(for exceptions, see Amenta 2006; Cress and Snow 2000) delve more deeply into movement characteristics and movement actions-that is, into the tactics, the organizational structures, or the claims making of movements-to explore how movements can bring about success. As both Goldstone (2003) and McAdam and Su (2002) state, we know little about how movements succeed. Even some recent outcome studies that carefully scrutinize movements (e.g., Andrews 2001; Ganz 2000) tend to focus more on movement resources than on the actions of movement actors. In the end, we know little about what movement actors do to help them achieve their political goals.
In an attempt to give agency back to collective actors, we argue that a fruitful line of inquiry to understand how some movements succeed in achieving their political goals rapidly while others do so only slowly (or perhaps not at all) entails examining the particular strategic orientation of movement organizations. We hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, movement organizations engaged in what we call strategic adaptation are likely to gain rapidly the kinds of policy changes they seek. Movement groups not engaged in strategic adaptation are likely to gain the reforms they seek more slowly (or are unlikely to gain them at all). While social movement scholars are beginning to consider strategic collective action (Andrews 2001; Ganz 2000; Jasper 2004; McCammon, Hewitt, and Smith 2004) , no one yet has attempted to develop a precise definition of strategic action, nor have they examined systematically whether such action aids movement activists in their quest for political reform. While it may seem axiomatic to say that strategic collective actors are more likely to achieve their goals, few social movement scholars have explored the role of strategic behavior in winning political reforms.
Business and management scholars, on the other hand, for some time now have studied strategic action in competitive marketplaces and have conceptualized its key elements (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998; Eisenhardt and Sull 2001; Hamel 1996; Hamel and Prahalad 1989; Mintzberg 1987; Porter 1996) . We combine insights from the business literature with those of social movement scholars to define a set of behaviors used by collective actors when acting strategically to win political goals. 2 We then go on to show that when movement actors pursue their goals by strategically 2 Although, as we show, there are useful parallels to be drawn between social movement organizations and economic organizations (see as well McCarthy and Zald 1977) , there are also important differences between the two groups. For instance, businesses operate in a competitive marketplace, provide products and services, and typically define their primary goal as profit making. Social movement actors operate in a contentious political environment and their goals typically revolve around building movements and achieving significant social change.
adapting to the broader political environment, they are more likely to succeed in rapidly winning the political reforms they seek.
Our methods are midrange in scope, meaning that we include enough cases (15 states and the women's jury movements in those states) to allow us to compare multiple movements systematically to discern causal patterns across cases. But we also limit our number of cases so we can gather detailed information on each one concerning not only the opportunities, constraints, and cues in the broader environments but, importantly, the specific tactics utilized by the movement organizations, changes in those tactics, and the reasons movement actors made those changes. Again, we find important variation among the state jury activists: some were quite strategic, others were not; some won their reforms quickly and others did not. Our close scrutiny of these efforts reveals that, as we hypothesize, a critical tactical dynamic in winning jury rights for women in rapid fashion was whether state jury movement organizations engaged in strategic adaptation. Below we elaborate on the forms strategic adaptation took in the jury campaigns, as well as how the broader environment in which jury activists operated shaped strategic adaptation. We turn first, however, to a brief history of women's jury rights.
WOMEN'S JURY RIGHTS
It is odd that researchers have given so little attention to jury movements. At the time of the campaigns, they were widely publicized and contested. For instance, in Wisconsin in 1921, women mobilized to win passage of a state Equal Rights Amendment. The equal jury rights provision in the proposed amendment was the most contentious item in the bill (Putnam 1924) . This theme was echoed by Eudochia Bell Smith, Colorado state senator, when she stated that the law putting women on juries was "one of the hardest fought bills ever passed by the Colorado Senate" (Smith 1945) . In 1939, when women in Illinois won jury rights and those in Vermont lost another round, the news made front-page headlines in the Chicago Tribune and the Burlington Free Press, respectively (Burlington Free Press 1939; Tagge 1939) . As one jury activist at the time stated, "Getting the word 'male' out of jury statutes is requiring something very like a second suffrage campaign" (Harrison 1930, p. 10) .
While many have suggested that women's political activism evaporated after the enactment of suffrage (see Andersen [1996] for a review), the state-level jury movements show that activism to broaden women's legal rights continued well after 1920. Women in New York, for instance, won the right to sit on juries in 1937, and their efforts to secure this citizenship role continued steadily between winning suffrage in that state in 1917 and winning jury rights.
3 At the national level, women's rights activists in time developed abeyance structures that were involved in only minimal movement mobilizations (Taylor 1989 ), but at the state level they remained active political agents, using their voting rights, their organizations, and their increasing presence in state political offices and parties (Freeman 2000) to broaden further their roles as citizens.
The right of women to sit on juries in the United States has a complicated history that unfolds across much of the 20th century. 4 In fact, it was not until 1975, with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Louisiana, that women's jury service was finally placed on an equal footing with men's. In this case the high court ruled that the Louisiana law requiring women to volunteer for jury service, while the state drew men's names automatically from a pool of "citizens who had reached the age of majority," was unconstitutional in that it violated not only the Constitutional guarantee of trial by jury but the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause as well.
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Prior to Taylor v. Louisiana, particularly in the early part of the 20th century, women were judicially disfranchised in most states. Only a few states allowed women on juries before the early 1920s. Wyoming and Washington did so just briefly between 1870 and 1892 but then rescinded the right (twice, in fact, in Wyoming).
6 Colorado, Idaho, and Utah each formally began permitting women on juries after granting woman suffrage in 1893, 1896, and 1895, respectively; Utah passed the first permanent women's jury statute in 1898. While there is evidence of women serving in isolated cases in these states, women jurors remained exceedingly rare (Boyd 1916; Harper 1904; New York Times 1907) . In Idaho, women were formally barred from jury service once again in 1924 as a result of a state supreme court decision (State of Idaho v. Kelley), and, in Colorado, Information about the various state campaigns is from archival data gathered for this study by the authors. 4 It is also a history that is not yet well recorded. Some contemporary accounts (Kerber 1998; Lemons 1973 ) are brief and thus not complete. Others focus solely on a single state (e.g., Azar 1980; Perry 2001; Rogers 2000; Vecchio 2002) . Still others are national in scope but consider primarily judicial law (Brown 1993; Grossman 1994; Lentz 2000; Ritter 2000 Ritter , 2002 , neglecting for the most part statutory law and women's activism for jury rights. 5 Taylor v. Louisiana concerned state courts. The Supreme Court ruled in 1946 in Ballard v. United States that women were allowed to serve on federal juries in the same capacity as men. The Taylor decision, however, had more far-reaching consequences given the substantially greater number of juries used in state trial courts (Carp et al. 2004) . 6 Wyoming permitted women on juries in 1870-71 and again in 1890-92 (Nelson 1955; Taylor 1959) ; the state of Washington allowed women to serve from 1883 to 1887 (Caplan 2005 The state of Washington made the first real breakthrough when its legislature passed a law in 1911 stating that all "electors" were eligible jurors (Caplan 2005) . In the preceding year, women won the right to vote in all elections in Washington, and beginning in 1911 women could and did serve on juries (Boyd 1916; New York Times 1911) . California, Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, and Oregon, all states in which women won voting rights prior to the 1919 federal suffrage amendment, followed suit in the next few years, giving women a place on juries (New York Times 1912; Matthews 1929) . Once the federal suffrage amendment was ratified in 1920, a handful of state attorneys general and judges assumed that women could sit on juries, in many cases because state laws stipulated that jurors were to be drawn from the pool of electors. Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, and Ohio all followed this path. In many of these states the assumption was quickly challenged in the courts or legislatures, but in most cases it was upheld (see, e.g., Palmer v. State of Indiana 1926; State of Iowa v. Walker 1921; Thatcher v. Penn., Ohio, & Detroit Rd. Co. 1928) .
In the years immediately following the ratification of the federal suffrage amendment, women in many of the remaining states began lobbying for jury rights. Arkansas, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin enacted women's jury laws in 1921. In at least some of these states, passage resulted from women's activism (Lemons 1973; Putnam 1924; Wheaton 1929) . In Arkansas, however, even with a law on the books supporting women as jurors, there is little evidence of women serving from the 1920s to the 1940s (see, e.g., Bailey v. State of Arkansas 1949). Jury commissioners there somehow simply failed to call their names.
In the remaining 30 states, women's organizations led efforts in the coming decades to gain the legal right to sit on juries. They did so with varying levels of mobilization, resistance from opponents, strategic adaptation, and success. Below we examine women's campaigns for jury rights in 15 states: California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Some of these states, such as California and Wisconsin, granted women a role on juries fairly rapidly. In others, the campaigns took many years to achieve their goal. In South Carolina, for instance, women worked for 31 years and were not successful until 1967.
We employ this categorization of our states-that is, the rapid and the slower states-in order to utilize two methods to analyze our data. First, we provide a detailed qualitative examination of the histories of the state jury campaigns to compare how women's groups won jury rights rapidly in some states but more slowly in others. This close examination of the histories in these contrasting states reveals how some movement groups strategically adapted their tactics to their environments and rapidly won a change in jury law, while movement organizations in other states continued their reliance on past practices, not altering or adapting their tactics to changes in their environments and thus slowing the pace of political reform. We then turn to qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to compare our states more systematically to see whether forms of strategic action identified in the qualitative analysis continue to explain the pace at which women achieved jury inclusion. We begin, however, by reviewing existing theoretical insights into how movements influence policy change and by developing our concept of strategic adaptation.
THEORIZING THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ON POLITICAL CHANGE
When are activists able to speed up the pace of policy reform? We argue that social movement organizations are most effective politically when they respond strategically to their environment, by shaping tactics to move forward after defeats, to counter opposition, and to take discursive advantage of contextual opportunities. We develop our theorizing in detail below. We first consider arguments others have offered to explain movement political success.
A sometimes implicit assumption of studies of social movements and policy outcomes is that the simple presence of a movement organization prompts lawmakers to reformulate policy (see, e.g., Amenta and Poulsen 1996; Costain and Majstorovic 1994; McCammon 1995) . Studies illustrating this line of reasoning often examine simply the existence of a movement organization; Soule and Olzak's (2004) study, for example, focuses on the presence of a state-level chapter of the American Association of University Women in explaining why some states ratified the Equal Rights Amendment. Such studies are typically quantitative and utilize a measure of only the presence of a social movement organization. Next, they reveal through statistical analysis that a significant relationship exists between the organizational presence of the movement and a key change in policy. Researchers then draw the conclusion that the social movement was at least in part responsible for bringing about the political or legal change.
One could explore such a relationship for the jury movements. A number of different movement organizations were involved in jury rights activism. For instance, the League of Women Voters (LWV) was the lead organization working for women's inclusion in a number of states. In other states, such as Georgia and Illinois, organized groups of women lawyers pressed for a change in law. In some states, such as Tennessee, the Business and Professional Women's Clubs (BPW) agitated for change. And in still others, the state branch of the National Woman's Party (NWP) played a prominent role or the state office of the Federation of Women's Clubs (FWC) was the leading organization pressing for policy change.
The simple presence of one of these organizations, however, is not likely to explain why some states granted jury rights sooner than others, because all the states we investigated had at least one such organization. We also found no pattern among the state jury movements suggesting that the presence of a particular type of women's organization (such as the LWV or the NWP) was able to achieve jury rights more rapidly. For example, the LWV was successful very quickly in California, but it took some time to succeed in Colorado.
We move beyond simple movement organizational presence and glean from the historical record information about how these groups campaigned for jury rights, particularly because our goal is to examine how movement actors can succeed rapidly in winning legal and political change. Amenta, Olasky, and Caren (2005) take a step in this direction by asking whether a higher level of activity on the part of movement organizations is a predictor of the likelihood of political success. Movement organizations actively engaged in tactical behaviors designed to bring about a change in the law, they argue, are more likely to produce the change. This is an obvious point, but it is one often overlooked when researchers measure only the simple organizational presence of a movement.
But are all movement activities similarly effective, even when one considers just those movement tactics expressly used to gain political change? Should one measure the overall amount of such activity, as Amenta et al. (2005) do, or are some actions more effective than others? Almeida and Stearns (1998) argue that disruptive or noninstitutional protest tactics will often best advance the political agenda of a movement (see also Gamson [1975] , McCammon et al. [2001] , McCarthy and Wolfson [1996] , and Soule et al. [1999] for tactical typologies). In his study of the Civil Rights movement, Andrews (2001, p. 76) suggests that activists using "mass-based tactics as well as routine negotiation" will be most successful in achieving their goals. Thus, along lines similar to arguments made by Morris (1993) , we are told that multiple tactics, particularly a diverse set of tactics, should be more useful to movements in their efforts for change than reliance on a homogeneous set of actions.
Higher levels of activism and a diverse set of tactics may aid movement actors in achieving their political goals, but we argue that even more important than the overall amount of activity and the diversity in movement actions is the fit of the movement organization's tactics to the broader environment. Amenta (2006) develops a similar point, indicating that, in political contexts where leaders are less sympathetic to movement demands, more assertive tactics are needed by social movement participants. We take this logic further by arguing and demonstrating that successful social movement organizations are those that are highly aware of the context in which they labor; that is, successful movement groups are attentive to information or signals that opponents and allies send them about the movement's progress or its lack of progress. If activists face a setback-for instance, losing a round in the legislative arena-successful leaders take seriously statements by lawmakers voting against the movement's bill as to why those lawmakers opposed it. Politically effective movement groups, then, turn such information into constructive advice about how they might adapt their tactical approach to overcome such resistance. High levels of activism, a diverse set of tactics, or more assertive actions may help. But, again, we argue, successful movement actors are attuned to their environment and tactically align themselves with the exigencies of the political and social context in which they act.
Work by Andrews (2001) and Ganz (2000) moves us in the general direction of examining the strategic responses of movement actors. Both of these researchers tell us that a more successful movement organization will have what Ganz calls "strategic capacity": that is, a certain set of organizational and personnel characteristics that allow the movement organization to develop the strategies and tactics critical to a successful outcome.
7 Diverse leadership and critical knowledge of the domain in which the group is working are key ingredients of strategic capacity. Examples from the jury movements, in fact, can be used to illustrate these concepts. Some of the movements had a diverse leadership when coordinated efforts were put forward by both the local office of the FWC (conservative) and the state branch of the NWP (radical). In Maryland, this form of diversity in leadership is precisely what occurred (Kennard 1931) . In addition, some of the women's organizations working on jury rights held workshops and provided other opportunities for their members to learn how to lobby and how to follow the legislative process. Women had just won the vote in 1920 and were conscious of their need to develop expertise on how the political system worked. Some state jury organi-zations, then, were explicitly developing the salient local knowledge that Ganz says is critical to movement success (2000, p. 1012) . For example, in Massachusetts the LWV held classes on how to approach legislators and ran articles in their newsletter and sent a series of memos to their local legislative chairpersons on lobbying techniques (SL 1931a (SL , 1931b Rotch 1948) . The BPW in Tennessee took similar steps in the 1940s (Tennessee Business and Professional Woman 1945; TSLA 1946) .
While strategic capacity makes important progress in our knowledge of how movements can succeed, such theorizing moves us away from the tactics of collective actors as they engage in contentious politics. Strategic capacity focuses us conceptually more on the organizational and leadership resources movement groups have and develop (such as salient knowledge and a diverse leadership) than on the strategies and tactics deployed in the struggle to reform law. We argue instead that to understand more fully why some movement groups succeed in achieving their goals while others do not or do so only very slowly requires examining precisely what the more successful groups do as they agitate for change (see Eisenhardt and Sull [2001] ; see also Hamel and Prahalad [1989] for parallel discussions in the business literature on resources vs. action).
We propose that movement organizations engaged in strategic adaptation are the ones most likely to gain the kinds of policy changes they seek and to do so rapidly, more so in fact than those with strategic capacity. Movement organizations with strategic capacity may well be more capable of adapting to their environments in strategic ways, but it is those groups that actually do the strategic adapting-that is, those that actually engage in the strategic behavior and not those that simply have the capacity to do so-that are more likely to bring about political change. Thus, we distinguish our argument from Ganz's (2000) and Andrew's (2001) in that ours focuses largely on strategic actions, while theirs focus largely on strategic resources. But what is involved in strategic adaptation? We now define our term more precisely, drawing on both the business strategy and social movement literatures.
Actors engaged in strategic adaptation typically execute four crucial steps, sometimes moving through them cyclically, meaning that ongoing strategic engagement causes actors to loop back and again move through the earlier and then later steps (Pietersen 2002; Johnston and Bate 2003) . The first strategic step entails having "a finger on the pulse" of the contentious arena (Pietersen 2002) . Here, strategic actors must be ready to perceive signals from their environment. They must listen for and consider these signals (or to use McAdam's [1982, p. 49] term, the "subtle cues") sent to them by targets, opponents, allies, potential allies, bystander publics, and even the general context itself. They may do this particularly when they experience a significant setback to their cause or even a serious defeat-for instance, when legislatures or the electorate voted against a change in jury law. A number of social movement scholars suggest that defeats or threats to movement goals can be an important factor that spurs movement action (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Tilly 1978; Van Dyke 2003) . Successful movements also keep their "finger on the pulse" of their opposition, listening carefully to opposition arguments and responding to opposition tactics (Benford and Hunt 2003; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996) . Finally, successful movements also will take note of important shifts in circumstances in the political and cultural context and react and adapt to such shifts. As we discuss below, one such shift that provided a discursive opportunity for a strategic reframing of the jury debate by jury activists was the transition into wartime (Koopmans and Statham 1999) .
We incorporate this thinking into the first step of strategic adaptation. Activists' perception of signals and even their openness to these signals about, for instance, why the defeat occurred, what the opposition is doing, and how the broader context has shifted will necessarily be influenced by the cultural tool kit and collective identities activists bring with them into campaigns, just as their perceptions are also shaped by the campaigns themselves (Swidler 1986; Polletta and Jasper 2001) . Nevertheless, an effective strategic response is, we argue, a response grounded in developments taking place in the arena of contention (Kriesi 2004) . New institutionalist organizational theorists posit a similar dynamic when they refer to institutional isomorphism or the process by which "organizational characteristics are modified in the direction of increasing compatibility with environmental characteristics" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 149). Scott et al. (2000, p. 171; see also Armstrong 2002b) speak of "institutional logics" (an element akin to the signals we refer to here) that reside in the organizational field and define appropriate means for pursuing goals. We hesitate to say, as other social movement scholars (McAdam 1982) have, that these signals typically indicate "opportunities" in the broader environment, because in the case of the jury rights movements, defeats or threats to the movement's goals, in addition to opportunities, signaled to activists a need for a strategic response. We develop this point further in our analysis below; here, in developing the first step in strategic adaptation, we refer to the messages received from the broader environment simply as "signals" and acknowledge that they can stem from threats as well as opportunities. Such signals can provide clear information about steps activists need to take to succeed, or they can be substantially more subtle, requiring a degree of interpretation (see also Meyer and Minkoff [2004] on signals). In either case, strategic activists will be poised to perceive these signals.
Second, following perception of the signals transmitted from the broader context, collective actors engaged in strategic behavior actively assess or analyze their own actions and claims making in light of those signals (Alinsky 1971; Johnston and Bate 2003; Stalk, Evans, and Shulman 1992) . That is, they gauge whether their current tactics are effective in moving the organization closer to its goals or whether new tactics are needed (Ganz 2000) . They must ask, Is progress being made? Or, instead, is resistance (or even apathy) toward the effort growing? This self-reflective or self-evaluative step reveals a movement group that is conscious that it can and must steer its actions toward those that strategically respond to the demands of the political context. Movement actors with political goals, that is, those making demands of the state, are highly likely to orient both of these first two strategic steps toward state actors, asking primarily: What are the signals being sent by state actors? Are the movement organization's tactics influencing the views of state actors in positive ways or are they failing to persuade? A number of movement and political sociology researchers have pointed to the importance of considering the views and responses of political elites (Desai 2002; Skrentny 2002) . Third, successful movement actors are willing and able to adjust their actions on the basis of what they learn in the preceding steps (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998; Porter 1996) . Collective actors must make choices (and, as Jasper [2004] states, "trade-offs" as well) in light of the signals they receive from targets, opponents, and other key actors in the field and in light of their analysis of the effectiveness of their previous tactics. Tactical innovations may emerge at this stage of strategic action (McAdam 1983; McCammon 2003) as well as disputes internal to the movement as to the best approach (Benford 1993) . Flexibility and, specifically, adaptation, however, are critical at this stage (Porter 1996) . A shift in tactics is typically required and the new tactics must "fit" the broader environment. That is, they must be those that social movement actors, based on their analysis of the situation, deem most likely to succeed, at least at the particular stage of the campaign (Alinsky 1971) . We readily acknowledge that new tactics will be constrained by the cultural orientation and political identities of the movement actors (Downey 1986 ). In fact, given gendered understandings of how women in the first half of the 20th century should behave in public, the jury activists rarely chose militant and aggressive tactics to further their cause (see Clemens [1997] and Ryan [1990] for discussions of cultural constraints on women's public actions). We also acknowledge that at any particular juncture actors may make mistakes and not choose a tactic that best responds to signals in the broader environment. Moreover, some activists may simply not have the necessary resources or strategic capacities to shift their tactics (Collis and Montgomery 1998; Minkoff 1999; Morris 1981) . They may be willing but simply unable to do so. Thus, while becoming a strategic collective actor may not be an easy task, we argue that successful movement groups will, over time, implement tactics well suited to the signals sent by targets and opponents.
Adapting to the broader environment is critical and, in fact, is why we argue that no one particular tactic (e.g., disruptive action; see Almeida and Stearns 1998) or combination of tactics (e.g., mass-based and routine negotiation; see Andrews 2001 ) is always the approach most likely to succeed. Nor do we argue that the overall level of activity of movement actors (Amenta et al. 2005 ) is the best predictor. The most successful tactics are those best tailored to the signals sent from the contentious arena about what is needed to succeed.
It is also important to recognize that strategic adaptation typically unfolds over time, as a group works continuously or nearly so on achieving a political goal and learns lessons about what works, what does not work, and how to adapt to contextual changes. Simple organizational presence at a given point in time (see, e.g., Soule and Olzak 2004) is not likely to be as important as whether the organization has worked strategically for a period of time to gain political reforms. Strategic adaptation may well depend on a significant amount of continuous organizational activity toward the cause to help activists gain in experience and knowledge about which tactics best respond to the political environment. Both our qualitative analysis and QCA will allow us to explore this interaction.
The final step in strategic action involves implementing or carrying out the tactical response (Pietersen 2002) . This is the follow-through stage. This step, obviously, is critical, because without this "action," the group in all likelihood will not move closer to its goal. In the reality of contentious politics, where some organizations work on multiple issues simultaneously (which was the case for some of the jury rights organizations) and where some collective actors must wait for the next legislative session to begin their intensive work (and in many states, during the period of jury activism, legislatures met only every other year), the implementation stage may be chronologically distant from the analysis stage. The chosen action may not always materialize due to a variety of factors. For instance, resources may be diverted to other causes or may become scarce. Completion of this step in the strategy process is thus crucial for success.
In sum, a concise definition of strategic adaptation is that it entails perceiving signals from targets, opponents, or other key actors about actions that will help the movement organization succeed; analyzing the signals in light of current tactics to determine which tactics are likely to be most effective in winning the movement group's goals; reformulating the group's tactical approach so that the approach deemed most effective is chosen; and implementing the desired changes in tactics. Figure 1 provides a summary of this multistep strategic adaptation process. A fun- damental assumption of our argument about strategic adaptation is that developments and other actors in the contested arena and the signals they send play key roles in shaping the movement group's tactical choices. Models of strategic capacity (see Ganz 2000; Andrews 2001 ) pay little attention to how targets and opposition, for instance, help shape tactical choice. Their focus instead is on the ways in which internal movement organizational characteristics (or the resources associated with strategic capacity) shape strategic action. Our model of strategic adaptation, on the other hand, points to the influence of developments in the broader organizational field in shaping activists' strategic behavior. But our model at the same time recognizes the agency of collective actors. If they can and do choose to engage in strategic behavior, we argue, their chances of achieving a political victory without significant delays are substantially increased.
Our argument, that politically successful collective action responds to signals received from the broader environment, is in line generally with arguments posited by the political mediation model of movement success. Amenta and his colleagues (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Amenta et al. 1994) argue that a favorable movement outcome is likely to occur when a movement is well mobilized and when political opportunities for success exist.
However, our strategic adaptation model goes a step further. We argue that successful movement groups will take steps to "fit" their tactics and strategic approach to the existing environment through the strategic adaptation process we have outlined (see also Amenta, Halfmann, and Young 1999; Amenta 2006; Clemens 1997) . It is not, we argue, a coincidence of movement mobilization and political opportunities that brings victory. Rather, it is movement groups mobilizing in ways that respond effectively to their environments (especially in formulating and implementing tactics) that are most likely to succeed in speeding up the pace of reform. Like those who support the mediation model, we, too, argue that a combination of movement actions and particular contexts shapes the success of movement organizations. However, we posit greater agency for movement actors and a much more intricate link between their actions and the broader environment. We argue that successful collective actors are highly flexible and adaptive. They are willing and able to change tactics and tailor their actions to fit developments in the broader environment. In this sense, they have a strong outward focus in their approach to winning political reforms. Our analysis will further illustrate how this process unfolds and particularly how tactics can be shaped to respond effectively to the sometimes subtle signals that tell activists which sorts of actions will be effective and which will not.
DATA AND DATA SOURCES
We include 15 state jury movements in our analysis: California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. To select our states, we divided the United States into regions (East, Midwest, South, and West) and randomly selected a roughly equal number of states from each region to ensure that our state movements would come from areas with differing political and cultural climates. Because the random sample did not provide enough variation on certain key dimensions (particularly, length of time to win jury rights), we made a few substitutions within regions. Thus, our sample of states, while no longer random, is a representative sample (Strauss 1987) , with important variation on the degree of mobilization for jury rights, the kinds of tactics used, the level of strategic orientation, the groups involved in the mobilization, the political and cultural climate in the states, and the amount of time it took activists to win a place on juries. 8 The particular period of activism is different in each state, but begins with women's first campaign for jury rights and ends when jury rights were won. Table 1 lists the periods of jury activism for each of our 15 states. We label states "swift" or "slow" in the table depending on whether campaigns in the state took less or more than the average number of years (21.8) to win women a place in the jury box.
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Information on the efforts of women to change jury laws and the contexts in which they pursued their goals comes largely from archival sources in each state. We visited 55 different archival sites, from the Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley, to the South Caroliniana Library at the University of South Carolina. (A full list of the archives and their relevant collections is available from the authors.) The records of key organizations (such as the state LWV and BPW groups) and individuals (both activists and politicians) involved in the campaigns, along with an extensive number of local newspaper accounts, articles from other periodicals (such as Equal Rights, Independent Woman, and Women Lawyers Journal) , and various legal and political documents (court decisions, briefs, legislative journals, and statutes) form the bulk of our source material. In addition, for some states, secondary sources on the state jury campaigns are available (e.g., Azar 1980; Perry 2001; Rogers 2000; Shank- Thompson 1994) . All seven authors spent considerable time locating, to the best of our knowledge, the full historical record of the jury campaigns for these 15 states. We conducted a detailed examination of the extensive primary and more limited secondary historical materials on the state movements and were able to construct lengthy chronological accounts of the development, characteristics, failures, and successes of the state jury campaigns. We use our source materials and chronologies to inform our analyses. We begin with the qualitative analysis in order to explore whether and how the actions of the activists in the swifter states differed from those in the slower states.
A QUALITATIVE EXAMINATION OF WOMEN'S JURY RIGHTS REFORM
A close look at the histories of the jury movements reveals pronounced differences between the states in which women won a place on juries more rapidly and those in which they won the right more slowly. The primary distinction is that the jury movement organizations in the faster states responded strategically to cues from the political arena. In states where women secured a place on juries more slowly, jury activists did not employ a strategic approach. We organize our discussion of the strategic actions of some of these movement groups, and the lack thereof in others, around four dynamics that emerge from the state histories: responses to legislative defeats, efforts to counter opposition to jury rights for women, discursive strategies during World War II, and continuous organized activity for jury rights. In each of these areas, marked differences between the swift and slow states are revealed.
Responding to Legislative Defeats
In many of the states where women gained a place in the jury box more quickly than average, a legislative defeat or a series of such defeats over a period of time triggered and then propelled a strategic response by movement activists. , CU 1937; Putnam 1924; TSLA 1942 TSLA -43, 1947 (California Historical Society 1915) . He explained that his informal polling of women in his district revealed that only 10% of women, a much smaller number, supported such a change. Jury activists turned these lawmaker signals about why legislators did not support jury rights into lessons about how the women should alter their strategy and tactics to win. Katherine Philips Edson, a jury activist, called for greater education among women "to show to the rank and file of the women why this was a necessary part of their citizenship" (UCLA 1915a). In a speech later in the year, she stated, "We started at the top and we must build from the bottom. We must create the demand and show why it is necessary for women to serve as jurors" (UCLA 1915b). Over the next two years California activists implemented an adaptive strategy. The California Federation of Women's Clubs carried on a vigorous educational campaign among its sizable membership (Los Angeles Times 1917b; Beebe 1916) , and the Women's Legislative Council, a large, politically focused organization closely allied with the FWC and the California Civic League, worked to educate the public on the issue (Cable 1916 (Cable , 1917 . The strategic analysis and adaptation paid off. Opposition inside and outside the legislature waned, and during the 1917 legislative session, women in California gained the right to sit on juries as lawmakers were finally persuaded that women did indeed want to sit on juries.
Remarkably, jury activists followed similar steps in a number of the other states where women won jury service more rapidly. In Illinois, for instance, as early as the late 1920s, women's jury proponents began to see that lawmakers were voting against jury rights because of their belief that women did not want the right (McLaughlin 1928) . The Illinois LWV's first reaction was to urge its members to attend legislative hearings in order to pack the statehouse galleries in a show of support (UIC 1927) . But still they met with defeat. By the early 1930s, jury advocates tallied lawmakers' votes and began to see that their greatest opposition came from "downstate" lawmakers who were likely to oppose the bill (CHS 1933b) . During the 1933 legislative session, the Illinois Women's Bar Association (IWBA), in order to symbolize support in the southern part of the state, sought out a downstate lawmaker to introduce the bill (CHS 1933a) . But defeat came once again, and an analysis of the outcome by IWBA members concluded that "downstate [legislative] members must be worked on and we should have a group to work on the women in the downstate communities" (CHS 1933c). Just as occurred in California, at this juncture, a large-scale movement effort worked to mobilize grassroots support in the state, particularly "downstate," including "a flying squad of speakers to go before assemblages of women" (CHS 1935 (CHS , 1936 . In 1939, Matilda Fenberg, a leader in the Illinois Committee for Women on Juries, called upon movement groups to shift their efforts from lobbying lawmakers to demonstrating grassroots support for the jury bill by staging mass meetings and letter writing campaigns. She stated, "Legislators told me they wanted to hear from individual constituents rather than from organizations" (CHS 1939a (CHS , 1939b . And again, receiving the signals from lawmakers and formulating a strategic response paid off. In the legislative session of that year, although strategic adaptation developed more incrementally in Illinois than in California, it bore fruit, and women in Illinois secured the right to sit on juries.
The legislative defeats that prompted a strategic response in the swifter states occurred just as commonly in the slower states. Yet defeats in the slower states did not spur a strategic response by movement actors. Activists in the laggard states were more inclined to react with simple frustration in the face of continuing denials by the legislature, rather than with efforts to adapt to the signals being sent by recalcitrant lawmakers. In Montana in the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, lawmakers opposed to jury bills that were repeatedly introduced in the legislature sent clear signals to organized women that they would not support the proposed law because of their sense that women did not want the bill (e.g., Helena Independent 1925). Representative Sylvan Pauly stated in 1931 that "none of his women folks wanted to serve on juries" and that "while he was aware that an active minority of women in the state favored the proposal, he was sure that most women did not want it" (Scott 1931, p. 4) . But rather than respond with strategic adaptation, members of the Montana jury movement simply became irritated with the legislature. In 1930, frustration on the part of Belle Fligelman Winestine, a key leader in the jury movement, began to surface as she spoke of the difficulties of working for jury service for women year after year (Papers of the League of Women Voters 1918-74). But she did not propose nor provide evidence of adaptive strategies. A similar response occurred in Maryland in the late 1930s. After the Maryland LWV met with resistance and ridicule among lawmakers as they pressed for jury reforms in 1935 and after the legislature defeated a jury bill, jury rights took a backseat in the League's legislative program for the rest of the decade (UM 1935 (UM , 1938 .
In other slow states, activists relied heavily on the same strategy and tactics year after year, being far less dynamic, adaptive, and transformative than movements in the more rapid states. Siegel (1981, p. 32) remarks that time and again Massachusetts jury activists would start up the same campaign machinery, relying on the same methods of influencing lawmakers and the public that they had used in the past, with few innovations. In 1934 the Massachusets LWV legal status committee chair succinctly stated, "No jury bill this year. Valueless to go before [legislative] Committee year after year with same group" (SL 1934). Georgia jury activists repeatedly had bills introduced in the legislature. Legislators regularly defeated these bills, and yet supporters of jury rights for women took no steps that appear in the historical record to make sense of the defeats. They simply continued year after year to employ similar strategies of letter writing and showing up for legislative hearings (e.g., Georgia Archives 1947). Only in 1952 did the president of the Georgia Association of Women Lawyers, Mary Wright, look over the situation and determine that greater "literature and speakers" were needed to offset public opposition to jury rights and opposing lawmakers must be approached individually by constituents well versed in arguments in favor (Rooney 1952, p. 4-E) . Wright stated that "Georgia women are waking up" (Rooney 1952, p. 4-E) . Immediately following her analysis of previous defeats and implementation of more responsive tactics, Georgia women won a seat on the jury bench in 1953. Jury movement organizations in the slower states were different from those in the swifter states. They were simply less interactive with their environment and less likely to adapt their tactics in the face of defeat. They were often less likely to perceive signals sent by lawmakers, and even when activists received signals, they were less likely to analyze their work and implement changes to counter resistance. The nonstrategic approach of these activists appears to have cost them in that jury rights for women took longer to be achieved.
Countering Opposition with Greater Political Support
There is also evidence that the movement groups in the states granting women jury rights more quickly responded strategically to opposition by increasing their political support, whereas the same pattern is not seen for the slower states. Moreover, the historical record makes clear that a sizable share of political support for the jury movements was the specific result of movement efforts to gain this backing, and it was not typically a political opportunity that existed independent of activists' efforts. So, for example, in Illinois, jury proponents sought out endorsements, particularly among judges who were willing to speak out publicly in favor of women on juries (UIC 1930). Activists strategically publicized this judicial support in part as a response to opposition to jury rights for women appearing in the Chicago Tribune just before a 1930 jury referendum (Kelley 1930; Wilson 1930) . Judges would likely not have publicly articulated their support of the jury movement if activists had not sought it out.
In 1930 as well, in New York, another swift state, recent defeats in the legislature and vocal opposition caused activists to seek greater support from the governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general, as well as a number of judges (Christian Science Monitor 1930; Warn 1930 ). Legislators had repeatedly told activists that they opposed jury rights for women because of their belief that women did not want such a right (CU 1927 (CU , 1928 . Speeches and letters by political elites were an attempt to persuade lawmakers to support the jury bill by offering alternative arguments. New York lieutenant governor Herbert Lehman, for instance, argued that women ought to perform this obligation to the state because women were citizens, just as men were, and attorney general Hamilton Ward stated that "the property and personal rights of women are constantly before jurors" and thus women should "have a part in settling their own problems" (Warn 1930 ). Both arguments shifted the focus away from whether women wanted jury rights or not. New York activists continued to seek the support of political elites to respond to opposition. In 1936, following a letter sent by Judge Frank Cooper to the New York State Senate, expressing his opposition to women on juries because, in his view, most women did not want to serve, the state LWV countered his claim by gathering various testimonials from judges saying that they did support women's presence on juries (CU, 1936a (CU, , 1936b . After a short period of cycling through this kind of strategic response to the opposition, in 1937, activists won the right to sit on juries in New York.
In Tennessee-again, a swift state-jury activists succeeded in placing one of their own in political office, taking a different route to increasing political support for jury rights. Ruth O'Dell, a BPW member, won a seat in the state legislature and, according to BPW records, worked tirelessly for BPW legislative goals, especially jury rights for women (TSLA 1938-39) . Interestingly, it was at this point in time that support for jury rights among women in the BPW began to grow and statements in the organization's documents no longer suggested a disinterestedness in jury service for women among members (Ritter 1937; Tennessee Business and Professional Woman 1938) . The BPW thus created a political opportunity for jury rights by winning a seat in the legislature for one of its members, and this opportunity then appears to have offset a lack of interest in and perhaps even some opposition to jury rights among its own members. In sum, not only did the movement groups in states giving jury rights faster respond to defeats in the legislature strategically, but they also responded to opposition in effective ways, by rallying greater political support for the movement.
Such responses are in direct contrast to the near absence of reaction to opposition in the jury movements in the slower states. For instance, in 1936 in Colorado, the state held a referendum on the jury issue. The Denver Post came out strongly against women on juries in articles and editorials, even publishing a sample ballot with the box labeled "against" marked with a check to encourage its readers to do the same (Denver Post 1936a , 1936b ). Yet there is no evidence that the Colorado jury movement attempted to refute the newspaper's stance. In Massachusetts in the 1930s, opposition to women on juries was pronounced at legislative hearings. Instead of responding to it, the NWP and LWV busily worked on a test case to take before the Massachusetts and then U.S. Supreme Courts, failing to achieve their goals at both levels (Grant 1931; SL 1931c SL , 1938 . Again, these movement groups appear to have been more isolated from the context around them, not only failing to respond strategically following a defeat, but ignoring inroads by the opposition. This disconnection on the part of these activists is likely to have contributed to the slower pace of reform in their states.
Strategic Framing during World War II
In three states (Missouri, Nebraska, and Vermont), women's groups won jury rights more quickly than average, although we did not find evidence that the movement organizations in these states regularly responded stra-tegically to defeats or to opposition. But each state granted jury rights to women during World War II, and in all three states we found numerous instances where the jury activists linked their rationales as to why women should be allowed in the jury box to the fact that the United States was at war. In short, we argue that jury proponents in Missouri, Nebraska, and Vermont engaged in strategic framing (McCammon et al. 2004; Rohlinger 2002; Zald 1996) . That is, they adapted discursively to the shifting cultural and political circumstances of war by altering their arguments to incorporate the war effort into their claims supporting women jurors. This use of a discursive opportunity provided by the war, we argue, is another form of strategic adaptation (Koopmans and Statham 1999) . Activists responded to the signals sent by wartime by introducing a new discursive frame in support of jury rights for women.
They did so in two ways. With the beginning of the war, in both Missouri and Nebraska, jury activists began to argue that because so many men were away fighting the war, a shortage of potential jurors existed. Adding women to the jury rolls would solve this problem. In Nebraska, as one historian (Caskey 1950) notes, the war shortage frame was the primary argument used in favor of jury rights during the war. In Missouri, the LWV repeatedly stated in hearings before the legislature that a bill such as this was needed because of the manpower shortage (UMST 1943) . In Vermont, on the other hand, a referendum granted jury rights to women in 1942 just after the U.S. entrance into the war. During the referendum campaign to persuade voters to support the measure, jury activists relied on a different wartime frame than that used in Missouri and Nebraska. As one Vermont jury proponent argued, "Equality and justice under the Stars and Stripes is the principle for which we are waging this war. . . . This election day gives the voters here at home an opportunity to express themselves . . . in order that our talk of equal rights and freedom may not be simply an empty boast" (Beebe 1942 ). Instead of a wartime shortage frame, in Vermont, movement actors put forward a wartime equality frame, arguing that the United States was fighting the war for principles of equality and justice and that such principles should be supported at home as well as in the vote on juries.
In both the shortage and equality frames, the war did not simply present itself as a context for furthering women's rights claims; rather, the activists strategically constructed arguments so that the war was made to provide a reason for supporting jury rights. Snow and colleagues (Snow et al. 1986; Cress and Snow 2000) point out that when movement actors utilize frames that allow potential supporters to see connections between their existing beliefs and values and those espoused by the movement, the movement will be more successful in gaining support and the reforms it seeks. Jury activists in Missouri, Nebraska, and Vermont were able to link the discursive opportunity provided by the war effort to their campaigns for women's jury rights, fostering greater resonance for their ideas about women's rights with the vast majority of the population who backed the war effort. Thus, the more rapid success in Missouri, Nebraska, and Vermont can be explained by the connections activists made between wartime and women's jury rights.
These three states, however, were not the only states in which women juror supporters used wartime framing to promote their cause. Wartime framing occurred in two other states. 10 In Texas, we found one instance of a wartime shortage frame. The fact that the frame was not more widely promoted in Texas probably helps explain why Texas did not grant jury rights during World War II. Had activists used a wartime frame more widely in Texas-that is, had they adapted more vigorously to the war climate-the movement might have succeeded during the war. At least, the examples of Missouri, Nebraska, and Vermont suggest this might have been the case. Colorado, another state in which activists employed a wartime frame, presents a bit of an anomaly. Jury activists used wartime shortage frames with some frequency in Colorado and the state granted jury rights by the end of the war, with the electorate voting in favor in 1944 and the legislature passing enabling legislation in 1945. The Colorado jury movement took 33 years, however, to win a role for women on juries, making it one of our sluggish states in terms of broadening jury laws to include women. Although the Colorado jury movement acted strategically during World War II by framing jury rights in ways that aligned the movement with the war effort, during the many years of activism prior to this (beginning in 1913), we find no evidence of strategic adaptation. To pose the counterfactual for Colorado, as we did for Texas, one could say that if the Colorado movement had acted more strategically early on in its career, perhaps it would have been politically successful far sooner than 1945. This makes the case of Colorado similar to that of Georgia: both are states in which movement actors finally took adaptive steps after a long period of little or no strategic action, only to win jury rights promptly after taking such steps. 11 10 In the remaining five states that had not yet enacted jury rights for women by World War II (Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Tennessee), we found no wartime framing by activists. And none of these states changed their jury provisions to include women during the war. 11 See our earlier discussion of Georgia activists' later strategic response to legislative defeat.
Continuing Organized Activism
We find a fourth difference between states giving women a place on juries promptly and those taking a longer amount of time to do so. In the more rapid states, groups working for a change in jury laws did so more continuously than did those in states that were unhurried in their response to demands for new jury rights. To gauge continuity of activism, we use a measure of the percentage of years during the period of jury rights activism in a state in which at least one women's organization was working actively on the campaign. Overall, our state movements averaged active engagement in jury rights efforts three-quarters of the time (76.5% of the years). Table 2 lists percentages for the individual states. California, Illinois, and Wisconsin had nonstop organizational engagement.
12 New York's women worked on jury campaigns 95% of the time and Tennessee's women devoted their efforts in 89% of the years. These five states, all of which responded strategically to defeats and opposition, had the highest levels of organizational engagement among our sample, with only Vermont, which granted jury rights during World War II, tying Tennessee at 89%. Moreover, in all of our strategic states the same women's group or groups were involved in the jury efforts throughout the period of activism. In New York, for example, the LWV worked almost relentlessly for 21 years to put women on juries. In Tennessee, the BPW in most years took steps to secure jury rights for women. On the other hand, in most of the slower states (Maryland, Montana, and South Carolina, in particular), no one particular organization worked continuously on jury rights. Rather, various organizations appeared to take turns at the helm in activist engagement for jury rights. In South Carolina, for example, the South Carolina Council for the Common Good worked on jury service in the early years of campaigning. For a short while the South Carolina BPW took the lead, and in later years, the South Carolina LWV took over campaigning.
It is unlikely to be a coincidence that all of the states responding strategically to defeats and opposition had organizations that worked nearly continuously on jury rights throughout the campaign periods. We infer from the evidence that a high level of continuous organizational commitment is a precondition for strategic adaptation. In all of our states that responded strategically to defeats and opposition, we can trace tactical development over time in the organizations continuously engaged in jury activism as they tried one tactic and then another and organizational leaders discussed which actions worked and which did not. For instance, in 1931, the New York LWV made sure that many women's organizations were present for the legislative hearing, but their publicity of the event drew in opposition as well and the jury bill was defeated. In 1932, the League's Legislative Committee, reflecting on the previous year, decided to take a different approach and kept the numbers of women's groups small, instead asking lawyers and judges to speak in favor (CU 1931 (CU , 1932 . Continuous engagement in jury rights activism allowed an organizational memory to develop in which signals sent by opponents and the results of previously tried tactics could be weighed and analyzed. This, then, is a more specific kind of knowledge than the "salient knowledge" theorized by Ganz (2000) . That is, we argue that organizational continuity allows collective actors to recall specifically which signals were sent by targets and opponents and which tactical responses did and did not work in the past. In short, the continuing activism of certain groups permitted a strategic expertise to develop over time. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that organizational continuity in the jury campaigns is an essential ingredient in developing a strategic orientation. It appears that strategic adaptation and continuously organized action work in combination to produce a swifter favorable movement outcome. We explore this interaction further in our qualitative comparative analysis.
QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: OPERATIONALIZATIONS
QCA provides an opportunity to compare the swift and slow states more systematically, utilizing Boolean logic to determine whether the factors we identify in our qualitative analysis emerge as well from QCA as important dynamics differentiating the faster from the slower states (Ragin 1987 (Ragin , 2000 . QCA is a particularly useful comparative tool because it allows us to consider that there may have been multiple routes to winning reforms rapidly and that no single explanation suffices (Cress and Snow 2000; Ragin 1987 ). Our qualitative analysis indicates that, among the more strategic states, jury activists employed different forms of strategic action. Some state movement groups responded strategically to defeats or to opposition, receiving signals from the political context, engaging in selfevaluation, conceiving of more effective tactics, and implementing these changes. In other states, strategic action took the form of responding to the discursive opportunity or signal provided by World War II and strategically framing the war. Results from QCA may confirm that these are distinct paths to rapid jury reform. Table 3 contains a list of the independent variables we use in our QCA along with their operationalizations. In most cases, two steps are involved in the construction of the variables. First, an overall count of the number of instances of the phenomenon in a state during the entire campaign period is gleaned from our sources. Second, we determine whether the state is above or below average for the phenomenon compared to the other states in our sample. To arrive at this latter determination, we divide the total number of instances of the particular phenomenon in the state by the number of years of jury activity in that state. We then compare the average for each state with the overall average for all states. If a particular state is above the overall average, the state receives a score of 1 for the measure and if below the overall average, a score of 0. We follow these two steps (counting the occurrence of the phenomenon within a state and computing whether the state is above or below the overall state average) to construct all of our independent variables for QCA, with the exception of the war framing measure, which we discuss below. In the following discussion, then, we describe only the first step in constructing measures for QCA, given that the second step (i.e., of comparing a particular state to the overall average) is the same for the various indicators. Table 3 also provides the QCA variable name for each of our measures. These names appear in parentheses in the following paragraphs as well.
Strategic response following a defeat (RESP DEFEAT) is coded 1 if activist groups engaged in a cycle of strategic adaptation following a defeat (and 0 otherwise). Such a cycle entails all four steps of strategic activity: (a) perceiving signals from the broader environment, (b) analyzing whether existing tactics are effective, (c) adapting and revising strategies on the basis of the signals and analysis, and (d) implementing alternative tactical approaches based on the previous steps. The process or cycle of adaptation often takes place over more than one year. Strategic response to the opposition (RESP OPPOSITION) is a measure of efforts by activists to respond to opposition by increasing political support for jury law reform. In order to do so, activists first needed to (a) perceive opposition, then (b) decide whether existing responses, if they offered any, were effective. They then needed to (c) evaluate new tactics and, finally, (d) implement the new tactics (such as seeking support from political actors or increasing the movement's own representation in the legislature) in order to respond to the opposition. Again, this response follows the four critical strategic steps. The measure is coded 1 if activists took these steps and 0 otherwise. Opposition came in a variety of forms, such as individuals or organized groups speaking publicly against jury rights for women, newspaper articles and editorials written in opposition, legislators reporting that their constituents did not support women's jury service, and jury activists revealing their difficulties in recruiting sup-porters of jury rights. Activists seeking political support when confronted with such opposition found support typically from one or more female political allies in the state legislature or from nonlegislative political allies, such as the governor, a prominent judge, or the state attorney general.
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In Tennessee, as noted above, a member of the state BPW secured a seat in the state legislature.
Our war framing measure (WAR FRAME) is not coded 1 if the state is above average on this indicator. Rather, the measure is coded 1 if activists in the state utilized either the war shortage frame or the war equality frame at any point during World War II. All other states are coded 0.
We measure the continuity of jury movement organizational activity (CONTINUITY) with the percentage of total campaign years in a state in which at least one women's organization (i.e., the LWV, the BPW, the FWC, the NWP, or a women lawyers' association) worked to put women in the jury box. As reported above, for states in which the pace of reform was more rapid, the same organization worked for jury rights throughout the campaign period.
Our dependent variable indicates whether a state movement achieved jury rights rapidly or slowly. We determine whether a state is swift or slow by counting the number of years from the beginning of women's campaigning for jury rights in the state until the state granted those rights. We labeled states below the overall average number of years (21.8; see table 1) "swift" and those above the average "slow." 14 QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: RESULTS Table 4 presents our main QCA results. The findings reveal various paths to women's jury rights reform. Part A contains the results for states 13 We did not include movement attempts to secure support from male legislators in this measure, given that this occurred in most campaigns and thus there would be little variation in such a measure. 14 Below we discuss states that cluster near the average on this measure. State jury laws granted women either mandatory or permissive jury rights. A mandatory law (passed in California, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Montana, South Carolina, and Vermont) defined women's jury service on the same basis as that of men. Women were required to serve as jurors, and the same exemptions that were allowed for men were instituted for women. Permissive laws (passed in the other eight states in our sample) treated women differently than men. These laws allowed women to be exempted from jury service simply because they were women. We do not distinguish between these two types of jury rights here. For the jury movements, the passage of either was considered a significant victory. We did find evidence in New York that activists there worked sporadically for a mandatory law after winning a permissive law in 1937. We did not find continued activism in the other permissive states. passing jury rights more quickly than average, and part B the results for states in which the pace of reform occurred more slowly. The second column lists the paths to reform. The third column shows the states following each particular path. As is customary in presenting QCA results, capital letters for variable names indicate the presence of a circumstance (in our case, typically that the state is higher than average on the measure); lowercase letters indicate its absence (or that the state is lower than average). The lack of a variable in the path means the measure is irrelevant to the causal combination. The asterisk (*) in the equations indicates "and," while the plus sign (ϩ) means "or" (and thus each row in the table represents a different path to jury reform). No contradictions appear within the table; that is, the paths for the states passing reforms more quickly and more slowly are distinct with no overlap.
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The results in part A indicate two causal paths to rapid jury rights reform. The first path, followed by California, Illinois, New York, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, entails substantial strategic adaptation. RESP DE-FEAT and RESP OPPOSITION are present in this path. Movement groups in these states, just as our qualitative analysis revealed, responded strategically to defeats and to opposition, adapting their tactics in both cases to overcome their difficulties. The second path in part A provides the route to jury reform followed by Missouri, Nebraska, and Vermont. These movement actors responded strategically to World War II, framing the goals of the jury movement in ways that aligned with the war effort. WAR FRAME is present in this path. One readily apparent finding in these results is that a single causal path (or combination of factors) cannot best explain how women succeeded in winning jury rights rapidly. Rather, activists followed two different paths, one involving a strategic response to defeats and opposition and the other involving strategic framing during World War II.
Jury activists in states passing jury rights more slowly were not strategic in their efforts, neither in terms of their responses to defeats or opponents nor in terms of framing World War II strategically (see part B). The "resp defeat" and "resp opposition" measures show that activists in these states responded strategically less often to defeats and opposition (in the latter path, "resp opposition" is irrelevant), and the "war frame" measure reveals that either a state did not engage in war framing or the measure is irrelevant in the path. Our qualitative analysis revealed that both Colorado and Texas did frame jury rights for women in terms of World War II, but this occurred only once in Texas and very late in the overall jury campaign in Colorado. In the end, the QCA results suggest, war framing is not a factor where jury rights are won slowly. The QCA results thus confirm our qualitative results. The jury movement groups in states enacting women's jury laws more slowly were less strategic and adaptive in their collective actions than were the movement organizations in states passing jury laws more rapidly.
The organizational measure in these models (CONTINUITY) allows us to explore the role of more continuous organizational activity in some states. All of the movements in states where the pace of reform was rapid had higher than average levels of organization continuity (see part A). In fact, the paths in part A could be simplified as CONTINUITY * [ (RESP DEFEAT * RESP OPPOSITION) ϩ WAR FRAME]. This is in distinct contrast with the causal combinations defined for the states passing jury reforms more slowly (part B), where none of the paths include higher than average organizational activity. A movement organization continuously and actively working for jury rights appears to have been a key ingredient in bringing about jury rights for women more rapidly. Moreover, in the five states where jury movements strategically responded to defeats and opposition (California, Illinois, New York, Tennessee, and Wisconsin), higher than average organizational activity existed during the jury campaign years. It seems likely that where women's organizations such as the LWV, BPW, or NWP were regularly involved in campaigns for jury rights, movements could be more strategic in adapting their tactics to winning jury reforms. Strategic adaptation unfolds over time, and more continuous involvement of an organization in the jury campaigns would permit activists to analyze their actions in light of political developments and more readily implement their strategic response. However, the path followed by Missouri, Nebraska, and Vermont demonstrates that not all organizationally active jury movements strategically responded to defeats and opposition. These states, as well, had high levels of organizational continuity, but they did not engage in this often more elaborate form of strategic adaptation. Organizational activity can fuel more complex strategic behavior, but a full-blown strategic orientation does not always result from organizational continuity. Strategic behavior and organization thus remain distinct characteristics of the movements.
Because some of our state movements took roughly the average number of years to achieve jury rights for women (e.g., Missouri, Nebraska, and New York each took 21 years, and the average is 21.8 years; see table 1), we take an additional step to confirm that our QCA findings are not a result of this clustering near the middle. We reran QCA excluding any state within one standard deviation of the mean for the dependent variable. That is, we excluded Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, and Tennessee from the analysis. This allowed us to focus on only those states which are distinctively fast (California, Vermont, and Wisconsin) or slow (Colorado, Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas). We present the results from these analyses in parts C and D of table 4. They are virtually identical to those in parts A and B. Jury activists in California, Vermont, and Wisconsin, the states in which women won jury rights most rapidly, were strategic and had a continuous organizational presence (see part C). On the other hand, activists in the states where jury reform occurred much more slowly show little indication of strategic adaptation and were not continuously pursuing jury reform (part D). In fact, there are only two slight differences between parts A and B and parts C and D. The second (or war frame) path in part C shows that Vermont activists responded strategically to their opposition, whereas the war frame path in part A showed this form of strategic adaptation to be irrelevant to the path. Also, part B reveals two paths for the slower states, while part D delineates only one. We conclude from the results in parts C and D that our finding (that state jury organizations winning jury reforms at a faster pace are more strategic collective actors) is not determined solely by the states clustering near the average number of years for winning jury rights. 16 16 We ran three additional checks to explore further whether this clustering near the middle influenced our findings. First, we again reran QCA, labeling the eight states that are within one standard deviation of the mean on the dependent variable (listed above) as don't cares in the analysis. This allowed QCA to treat the cases as either rapid or slow states in its construction of the configurations (Ragin et al. 2006, p. 64) . The results were identical to those shown in parts A and B, again confirming our findings. Second, we also reran our analysis using fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), which allows inclusion of trichotomous variables. We are less comfortable using this method, given that three out of four of our independent variables do not cluster near the mean and thus do not warrant a tripartite construction. However, both the dependent variable and the CONTINUITY measure can be constructed as having three categories. We did this for each of the two measures by placing states within one standard deviation of the mean in a middle (that is, not high or low) category. These states were coded as 0.5 for these two measures. We then reran our analysis using fsQCA. The results confirmed the findings in parts A and B. The strategic and continuity measures appeared in the paths for the states granting jury rights more rapidly, although the continuity measure was less uniformly present. The paths were RESP DEFEAT # continuity ϩ RESP OPPOSITION # continuity ϩ RESP OPPOSITION # WAR FRAME ϩ resppdefeat * RESP OPPOSITION * CONTINUITYϩ . The last path (resp defeat * warframe * resp defeat * war frame * CONTINUITY CONTINUITY) seems to fit our hypothesis the least. However, the two states that follow this path are Maryland and Massachusetts, the states with the lowest midlevel pace of reform. The lack of strategic action in these states may explain why the rate of jury reform is slower in them. Finally, we also ran an event history analysis in which we converted our independent and dependent measures into annual-level variables, all beginning in 1913 (the year of the earliest jury campaign among our 15 states; see also McCammon et al. 2007 .) All four of our independent measures were statistically significant. In additional regression analyses, we included a variety of other DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The administration of justice in the United States was gendered far into the 20th century, until women were finally victorious in winning a place in jury boxes. While in a few states, this right came automatically with woman suffrage, in most states, organized women launched concerted campaigns to convince lawmakers to change statutory and constitutional law governing whose voice would and would not be heard in determining judicial outcomes. Some of these state efforts to change jury laws succeeded quickly; others took substantially longer. Our scrutiny of 15 statelevel jury movements and their campaigns suggests that the different pace of reform across the states can be traced to the different types of efforts put forward by movement activists.
Our key finding is that what movement actors do can influence the pace of their success in winning political reforms. In states where women won jury service more rapidly, jury proponents were highly strategic in their efforts to change the law. Following a legislative defeat, they reacted to lawmaker signals about how the right might be won in the future. In addition, they responded to public opposition by recruiting political support from female lawmakers or political elites outside the legislature or by winning election of one of their own to legislative office. In other states that gave women a place on juries more rapidly, activists formulated arguments in favor of women on juries in ways that framed wartime as an opportunity for broadening women's citizenship. These sorts of strategic steps, our results show, were critical in hastening jury law reform in these states. We find that strategic actions by movement actors can help us make sense of how some movement organizations succeed at a faster pace than do others. Movement groups engaged in strategic adapmeasures to explore the influence of additional factors that may have produced a change in jury law: %female lawmakers, %Democratic lawmakers, %Republican lawmakers, competitive legislative elections, use of a diversity of tactics by activists, movements that attempted to educate members on the lobbying process (to tap into Ganz's [2000] notion of salient knowledge), jury movements with diverse leadership, neighboring states that recently passed a law giving women jury rights (to explore a diffusion process), and movements with multiple women's groups working for jury rights. Only the last two measures were statistically significant when added to our model (including when we dropped our continuous organizational measure from the model for the multiple groups measure), indicating that movements with multiple organizations working for change fared better than those with only a single organization pressing for a change in jury law and that states with neighboring states that had enacted jury laws were more likely to pass such laws themselves. The regression results, however, suggest that our theoretical argument about the importance of strategic adaptation holds up well even when controlling for other influences on political outcomes. None of the results discussed here are shown, but all are available upon request. We conclude from these various tests that our hypothesis concerning strategic adaptation and the speed of political success is confirmed.
tation to their environment are likely to succeed more rapidly than movement groups that do not engage in strategic adaptation. Oddly, in social movement research, scholars have paid only limited attention to the impact of such tactical dynamics on social and political change (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004) . These results move us beyond models positing that the simple organizational presence of a movement produces political change. The analyses presented here delve into the specific kinds of behaviors movement actors engage in to expedite political success.
Our findings also show that activists often exhibit much agency in their efforts for change, certainly more than they are given credit for by researchers who focus heavily on contextual opportunities for success. Jury rights proponents were not only strategic but, with some frequency, they also created their own political opportunities, not waiting passively for them to occur. Activists sought out support from political elites, both inside and outside state legislatures. They made appeals to judges, governors, and other state officials to support the jury cause. In at least one case, they succeeded in winning election of one of their own organization members to the state legislature, gaining for themselves direct influence in the lawmaking process. Our results suggest that political opportunities are not always externally provided opportunities but instead can be created by movement actors themselves as they act strategically.
Our study also reveals that important variation among movement groups exists in their degree of strategic adaptation. Activists in some state jury movements were quite adaptive. Others, however, responded to legislative defeats or opposition to women on juries with resignation or frustration. Too often, social movement researchers fail to see differences among movements or movement groups in their degree of strategic action (although see Andrews 2001; Ganz 2000) . Some movement organizations are simply more willing or capable of altering their tactical approach and adapting to the larger environment. Some groups, in fact, may change midstream, becoming more or less strategic over time. Political process theorists assume that in the face of few or no political opportunities for change, those pressing for reform will turn heel and demobilize (Eisinger 1973; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998) . Our results, however, suggest that, at least for some movement organizations, leaders reconstruct the meaning of defeats to suggest opportunities for altered action. Instead of confronting setbacks and resistance with surrender and withdrawal, some movements groups forge ahead with new tactics-tactics designed to overcome earlier weaknesses.
Future research on strategic adaptation should explore why some groups act in more strategic ways than others. Our research suggests that social movement organizations working continuously to win jury rights for women are more likely to be strategic, suggesting that one key ingre-dient producing a strategic orientation is the experience and knowledge gained through the extended and ongoing pursuit of a collective goal. Studies of organizational change, however, suggest that additional factors may matter as well, particularly shifts in the broader cultural context (Armstrong 2002a) or legal environment (Fligstein 1990; McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson 1991) , which can alter the tactical repertoire and adaptive capacity of movement actors. Leadership styles and even the degree to which leaders in one movement group interact with and learn from other movement organizations-in the case of the jury movements, including those across state lines-are also likely to shape a movement's strategic orientation (McCammon 2003; Morris and Staggenborg 2004; Voss and Sherman 2000) . A group's strategic capacity (Andrews 2001; Ganz 2000) is likely to matter as well. Exploring the causes of strategic adaptation will deepen our understanding of this important facet of collective action.
While the analyses presented here have established the importance of strategic adaptation in speeding the pace of political reform for collective actors, future research will need to consider the explanatory power of strategic adaptation in combination with other factors that lead activists to their desired political outcomes. We expect that, as political mediation theorists (Amenta et al. 1992) suggest, when social movement groups engage in strategic action and when the broader political environment is generally conducive to political reform, activists will be more likely to succeed in gaining the reforms they seek. In addition, it may be that strategic discursive responses in culturally "unsettled" times (Swidler 1986) , with activists framing their arguments in ways that align their goals with emerging ideational elements, are particularly helpful in moving collective actors closer to their political objectives (McCammon et al. 2007 ). Disentangling the circumstances in which these different paths to reform are most potent will also enrich our understanding of strategic adaptation.
In the end, however, we learn from these analyses that the jury activists were agents in bringing about reform, but their jury campaigns were also fundamentally influenced by the context in which they took place. To win reforms more quickly, activists had to respond to their environment, receiving the signals sent by lawmakers and being strategic in their response to defeats and to opponents. Clearly, as the political mediation model (Amenta et al. 1992 ) holds, success stems from an interaction between the agency of movements and their environment. But our results reveal that social movement organizations capable of achieving their goals quickly are not simply those that are well mobilized. Rather, those that carefully tailor their tactics and strategy to the environment in which they seek their reforms are most efficacious (see also Amenta et al. 1999; Amenta 2006) . In a sense, a strategic "dance" occurs in which the more successful activists do not necessarily subscribe to any one particular tactic or even a diverse combination of tactics. Rather, they choose tactics that "fit" the context in which they press for change. If targets tell them "women don't want jury rights," activists engaged in such a dance mobilize greater support and turn up the volume of demands for a place on juries to demonstrate that women do want the reform. Their tactics-those most effective in winning reforms quickly-are actions that respond to messages from the environment about what will succeed. What successful movement organizations do is highly important in understanding their success, and what they do is adapt their tactics to signals from the broader environment about what will work.
